Your tax dollars just paid for a system that a cop used to track his ex-girlfriend’s every move. And after getting caught, Flock—the company that owns the surveillance network—announced new rules. Again.
If you’re feeling a familiar wave of disgust, you’re not alone. The cycle is maddening: police abuse a tool, the company issues a press release, nothing changes, and the next victim is just a database query away.
Flock’s CEO, after the latest scandal, said he wants a “fair shot.” But the company has already blown through multiple chances. The problem isn’t that they haven’t tried. The problem is that trying is the wrong response.
Here’s the uncomfortable truth: Flock doesn’t need to stop abuse—it just needs to look like it’s trying. The new rules are liability mitigation theater, not real reform. They’re designed to protect Flock’s market share from public backlash, not to protect citizens from state overreach.
Let’s be clear about what’s happening. Flock sells license plate readers that give police real-time tracking of every car that passes a camera. The company says it has “rules” against misuse. But when a cop uses the system to stalk his ex, the rule doesn’t stop him. The rule just gives Flock a way to say, “We’re sorry, we told them not to do that.”
As one commenter on the article put it: “Um, there were already “rules” but the cops ignored them. How will this be any different?” Exactly.
The structural constraint is this: Flock’s customers are police departments. Police departments are state-backed actors with immense power. A company that depends on selling to those departments cannot afford to enforce its rules when they conflict with police interests. It’s a classic principal-agent problem, except the agent is a private surveillance company and the principal is the government.
When the cops are your customers, you can’t police the cops. That’s not a bug; it’s the business model.
Flock’s new rules include audits and data retention changes. But audits are only as good as the auditor’s independence. And data retention doesn’t matter if the cop already saw the data. The only real fix would be independent oversight with actual enforcement power—something no private company has ever voluntarily handed over.
So what’s the real problem? It’s not that Flock’s rules are weak. It’s that private tech companies are now the de facto arbiters of constitutional rights. Your Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure? It’s only as strong as a corporate terms of service document that can be rewritten at any time. When a cop uses a Flock camera to track you, the company’s “privacy policy” is your only shield. And that shield is made of paper.
We’ve handed the keys to the panopticon to a for-profit company and then asked them to be nice. That’s not a strategy; it’s a fantasy.
The twist is that Flock’s “fix” will actually make things worse. By appearing to address the problem, it gives cover to the very system that enables abuse. The CEO can point to the new rules and say, “See? We’re responsible.” Meanwhile, the same structural incentives remain: cops need data, Flock needs cops, and the public is left holding the bill.
You’ve probably noticed that every surveillance scandal ends the same way: a promise, a policy update, and a slow fade. The next time a cop uses a Flock camera to stalk someone, this article will be dust, and the company will issue another mea culpa. The only way to break the cycle is to stop pretending that corporate rules are a substitute for democratic oversight.
Demand independent audits. Demand public control over surveillance data. Demand that the people who build these tools be accountable to the people they surveil, not the people who pay for them.
Because right now, the system is working exactly as designed. And that’s the scariest part of all.
FAQ
Q: Why would Flock bother issuing new rules if they know they won't work?
A: Because the goal isn't to stop abuse—it's to manage public outrage. New rules give Flock a PR shield to say 'we've taken action' while maintaining the same business model. The rules are designed to be enforceable only against the company's own reputation, not against its customers.
Q: What practical change would actually prevent cops from using Flock for stalking?
A: Independent oversight with real teeth: a third-party auditor with the power to suspend access, issue fines, and refer cases for criminal prosecution. Plus, mandatory public reporting of every access request. Without that, any rule is just a suggestion.
Q: Isn't it unfair to blame Flock when the cops are the ones breaking the rules?
A: Cops are responsible for their actions, but Flock built the tool and controls the access. A company that sells a surveillance system to police knows exactly how it will be used—and profits from that use. Claiming innocence while collecting the checks is disingenuous. The real question is why we allow private companies to be the gatekeepers of our rights.